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SYMPOSIUM DEBATE TRANSCRIPT: THE PROMISE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: REALISM VERSUS LEGALISM. 
 
 
This debate took place at Notre Dame Law School on February 21, 2020 as 
part of the Volume 10 Symposium. The Symposium featured two panels and a 
debate, all incorporating the theme of International Law & the Rule of Law. 
Recordings of all three sessions, as well as opening remarks from one of the 
Journal’s faculty advisors, Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, and the dean of 
Notre Dame Law School, G. Marcus Cole, can be found on the Journal of 
International & Comparative Law website.1 
 
Moderator: Professor Michael C. Desch (Department of Political Science, 
University of Notre Dame) 
 
Debaters: Professor John Mearsheimer (Department of Political Science, 





Introduction (Rocheville): Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you all for 
joining us for our featured lunchtime debate: “The Promise of International Law: 
Realism versus Legalism.” My name is Brad Rocheville, the editor-in-chief of 
the Journal of International & Comparative Law, here at the Law School and it 
is my pleasure to introduce the moderator, Professor Michael C. Desch. 
Professor Desch is the Packey J. Dee Professor of International Relations at the 
University of Notre Dame and the founding director of the Notre Dame 
International Security Center. He specializes in international relations, 
American foreign policy, international security, political thought, and world 
politics. Professor Desch previously served two terms as chair of Notre Dame's 
Department of Political Science and was the founding director of the Scowcroft 
Institute of International Affairs and the first holder of the Robert M. Gates 
Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-making at the George Bush 
School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He also 
served as assistant director and senior research associate at Harvard 
University's Olin Institute of Strategic Studies. Professor Desch has written a 
number of articles and books, including Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning 
Influence of Social Science on National Security. He previously worked for the 
federal government at the U.S. Department of State, as a congressional research 
service for a U.S. Senator. Professor Desch received an M.A. of International 
Relations, a PhD in Political Science from The University of Chicago. Please 
join me in welcoming Professor Michael C. Desch.  
 
Desch: Hi. Thanks for the kind introduction. It is ten times longer than the 
introduction that I'm going to give our two speakers. Nonetheless, it's 
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appropriate. My colleagues and I are thrilled to co-sponsor this event, 
particularly this top of the fight card event, which I'm re-titling “The Promise or 
False Promise of International Law”. Each of our legal pugilists is going to get 
ten minutes of opening remarks and then they'll get five minutes of follow-up, 
and then we're going to go to Q&A from the audience, and I'll give each of our 
speakers a brief last word. Mary Ellen O'Connell needs no introduction in this 
forum and I'm not going to give her one, other than to say that she is the Robert 
and Mary Marion Short Professor of Law and a research professor in 
international dispute resolution. She has published two books with Cambridge 
University Press that came out in 2019, so we're looking forward to hearing her 
in this debate. On the other side of the card, we have Professor John 
Mearsheimer. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of 
Political Science at The University of Chicago. He also has a recent book out: 
The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams in International Realities. Professor 
Mearsheimer will speak first.  
 
Mearsheimer: Thank you very much for the kind introduction. Thank you, 
Mary Ellen, for inviting me to visit today for this debate and thanks all for 
coming out to listen. The subject before us today is the relevance of international 
law for international politics. This boils down to the question of how 
international law affects state behavior. Before I get into the heart and soul of 
my argument, I want to make two preliminary points. The first is that I'm talking 
about international law only. I'm not talking about domestic law. And, as will 
become clear by the end of my talk, I have very different views of domestic law 
and international law. My second point is that I view international institutions 
and the rules that are at the heart of them as effectively the same as international 
law. I consider laws, rules, and institutions as within the same package of 
entities. Occasionally, I'll use the words “law” and “rules”, but my arguments 
apply to both. Now, in the context of discussing realism and legalism, I'm simply 
going to give you one realist view on international law. I don't know if I agree 
with Hans Morgenthau or Kenneth Walsh on every point. You will get John 
Mearsheimer's view of international law and I'm going to make two major 
points. The first is that many people think realists believe that international law 
and international institutions don't matter at all. Some people even say that we 
realists believe that international law and international rules are dangerous, that 
we must get rid of these things. Nothing could be further from the truth. I just 
want to make that clear. Realists like me believe that international law and 
institutions matter. International institutions matter in big ways for several 
reasons. First, if you're interested in running the world, there's no way to do it in 
our highly globalized world without international institutions. There is a 
tremendous amount of interdependence in terms of economics, security, and 
politics among nations. There's no way that a great power like the United States 
can manage things like trade without rules, without laws. Thus, they are 
absolutely essential. Consider the Cold War, in which the United States created 
a Western order that included NATO, the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank, 
among others. These are all institutions that we needed and they were comprised 
of rules and laws. So, the idea that a realist like me thinks great powers don't 
need institutions is erroneous. Second, the United States writes the rules in ways 
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relatedly, this strategy is really useful for coercing minor powers. International 
law and institutions are really great for the United States because they help it 
achieve its goals. Consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is how the 
United States prevents countries around the world from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. The United States likes nuclear weapons. However, it does not believe 
anyone else should be allowed to have them. And it uses international laws to 
prevent others from getting those weapons. The United States likes the 
international regime because of its simplicity. The fourth and final reason that 
America favors the international legal regime is because it permits the U.S. to 
break rules it does not like. Furthermore, it is very important to realists that 
international law and international institutions cannot force states to obey the 
law when those states think it is in their vital interest not to obey the law. Basic 
realist logic justifies this claim. And I think this is the point where Mary Ellen 
and I fundamentally disagree. I think that Mary Ellen and people of her 
persuasion believe that international law and international institutions can 
exercise coercive power over states when their vital interests are at stake, and 
that those states will be compelled to obey the rules. Realist 101 logic makes me 
think that this is impossible. The basic argument here is that states operate in an 
anarchic system. There's no higher authority above states. States can never know 
the intentions of other states. They wake up one day living next to Adolf Hitler 
who has considerable power and malign intentions. You dial 911 to call the 
international system and there's nobody on the other end. In that kind of world, 
you have to make sure you have as much power as possible. To the Americans 
in the room, how many of you go to bed at night worrying about Canada or 
Mexico attacking the United States? The answer is "none" and the reason is 
because America is like Godzilla surrounded by Bambis. That is the best way to 
survive in a system that lacks a higher authority according to basic realist logic. 
This tells us that when you're in a self-help world and the law says you have to 
do something that is at odds with your perceived vital interests, you're going to 
break the law or disobey the rules. This is not to say that you're a constant 
lawbreaker because, again, my argument is that great powers write rules they 
like and therefore usually obey. Nonetheless, there are those situations where 
international rules are at odds with a nation’s vital interests and that nation then 
violates those rules. This is fundamentally different from domestic politics 
because a higher authority exists in there. What Thomas Hobbes called the 
Leviathan, we call the state. When you get into trouble, you call the police and 
your lawyer. And in that context, law has a different meaning—not a completely 
different meaning, but a very different meaning. I think Mary Ellen and I would 
agree completely on the importance of the rule of law inside the black box. But 
once outside the black box and in the realm of international politics, I 
believe international law matters. The world Mary Ellen envisions can only exist 
is if you escape international anarchy. A really terrific little book that you can 
read on the subject is Lowes Dickinson's book, entitled The European Anarchy. 
Dickinson, one of the founding fathers of the League of Nations after World War 
I, invented the concept anarchy as it applies to international politics. This is a 
brilliant little book and he basically said that as long as you operate in an 
anarchic world, states are going to behave the way I argue that they will. And he 
said that if you want to escape that world, one must transcend anarchy and move 
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in domestic politics. In other words, a world state. Well, for better or for worse, 
I do not envision the rise of a world state because the most powerful political 
ideology on the planet is nationalism, and nationalism requires nation-states. 
Nation-states do not disappear. We are going to live in a world of nation-states 
as far as the eye can see. That means we're going to continue to live 
in international anarchy. And as long as we live in international anarchy, there's 
no way the great powers are ever going to obey international law or the rules 
that are at the heart of institutions if they think those laws or rules clash with 
their vital interests. Thank you. 
 
Desch: Thanks John. On time and on target. Mary Ellen, you may begin. 
 
O'Connell: I don't know about all these war metaphors and fighting metaphors. 
I'm here for an exchange of intellectual ideas. I want to just promote with all of 
you a better idea than the one we just heard. This has nothing to do with force 
and violence and everything to do with persuasion, beauty, and attracting all of 
you to a new way of thinking. Professor Mearsheimer deserves our respect. He 
deserves even our admiration. Imagine that Professor Mearsheimer, and just a 
few others, have succeeded in making this realist idea you just heard the 
dominant idea in U.S. foreign policy. My aim in this debate is to win all of you, 
but him, especially, away from that idea, in favor of what was once the true and 
important goal of U.S. foreign policy: promoting the rule of law in the world. 
That was the central aim of U.S. foreign policy for 175 years. I think we can get 
it back and we can do it starting today, right here. I'm going to make this 
argument in three parts. First, I'm going to define some terms. Second, I'm going 
to explain why legalism is superior to realism. And finally, I will show the harm 
that persisting with realism causes and argue that only a return to fidelity of law 
will lead to a better future for everyone listening in this room, in the overflow 
room, and around the world at large. Legalism, like realism, refers to a set of 
beliefs about the way the world works. Realists believe the world works on the 
basis of human survival instinct. They maintain that individuals seek self-
interest to accumulate wealth and other material goods, and that nations, just like 
individuals, act on self-interest too. Realists believe that individuals and states 
are locked in a competition with each other for wealth and will use force to 
achieve a desired outcome in that competition. Legalists, on the other hand, 
understand that the survival instinct that motivates human beings constitutes just 
one among many instincts. Although people are self-interested, they are also 
interested in the welfare of others. Oftentimes, they elect to promote another 
person's self-interest at the expense of their own. Human beings can be 
motivated by altruism, selflessness, spirituality, and emotion, as well as 
materialism. Law relies on people being both self-interested and concerned 
about the welfare of others. It thereby creates neutral principles and policies to 
resolve disputes and guide conduct. Law is based fundamentally on accepting 
and complying with these neutral rules and processes, regardless of coercion. 
Coercive enforcement is a part of law, but law does not depend on coercion. It 
is not essential to law. What is essential to the rule of law is that force is 
subordinated to law—that the physically powerful are not treated as superior to 
others under the law. The subjects of law are equal, whether human beings, 
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international community coercing the United States if the U.S. doesn't want to 
obey a particular rule. The international community expects voluntary 
compliance, with the occasional need for some kind of enforcement, and it does 
have means to make it costly even for the United States to disobey. Yet, 
fundamentally, it's about the belief in law, that we once held very dearly in 
America, and that we can again. Legalism promotes the idea that law and legal 
means are the moral and ethical approaches to problem-solving. Law is neither 
government nor liberalism. Governments administer states and represent them 
on the international plane. Law precedes government and it is essential to create 
government. It is necessary to create states. States are not organic creatures like 
people or animals; instead, they are legal constructs that need the law to exist. 
Without law, there is no institution of the state, let alone a governmental 
institution of the kind that Professor Mearsheimer likes. He very much likes 
NATO and we just heard him say he likes world trade institutions like the WTO. 
Respect for law and improvement in the law that founded these entities is needed 
to improve them for the good of the United States and all states. Finally, 
liberalism is not law but a set of beliefs. However, it is a set of beliefs about the 
proper relationship between individuals and their governments within states. 
Liberalism relies on law to limit government control of individuals. 
Consequently, liberalism has only limited relevance to international law; I share 
many of Professor Mearsheimer's criticisms of liberal hegemonists who 
violate international law and use military force to promote their liberal beliefs. 
Why is legalism a better idea than realism? Both legalism and realism are 
ideas—basic human constructs. However, law is a far older concept that has 
withstood the test of time. Law is the idea we return to after catastrophic failures 
to obey the law, such as in World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and in 2003 
after the Iraq invasion. Law us about the human capacity for altruism and the 
virtue of obedience to law, even when our action is done wholly in the interests 
of another. These are the ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, and they should be 
contrasted with the ideas of another Thomas—that Professor Mearshimer has 
already mentioned—Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes, a 17th-century British 
commentator, saw life as nasty, brutish, and short. He viewed human beings as 
in a perpetual war of all against all and that we would never conduct ourselves 
with generosity and respect for each other, unless coerced by government or 
anarchy. How many of you in this room need to be coerced or punished into 
being generous to another human being? Where would charitable donations be 
if fear was the only motivating factor? And, nevertheless, Hobbes' views 
influenced the development of realism, which was first invented in Europe in 
the 1930s, and aimed precisely at undermining international law. Early realism 
then traveled to the U.S. through the work of Hans Morgenthau, a German 
refugee and long-time political scientist at the University of Chicago. He 
promoted this idea in a book first published in 1948. In a series of 1951 lectures 
at the University of Chicago, U.S. diplomat George Kennan called on the U.S. 
government to abandon what he called the legalistic, moralistic, approach in 
U.S. foreign policy. Kennan wanted the U.S. to take advantage of its 
technological prowess at the end of World War II to amass weapons and military 
assets. He hoped this approach would get the U.S. to abandon the rule of law as 
part of foreign policy. Kennan thought the U.S. could become the newest global 
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Accordingly, the military-industrial complex was born and a thirty-year slide 
away from the rule of law—first abroad and then at home—began. The U.S. has 
been paying dearly for increases in spending on weapons and military assets as 
well as the abandonment of the rule of law. I'll provide just a few examples. 
First, consider the abject failure to commit the resources necessary to deal with 
the true existential threat this country faces, for example climate change and 
environmental collapse. We all know the harms of this failure: global 
pandemics, sea level rise, drought, flood, storms, famines, mass-species die-offs, 
uncontrolled fires in Australia, Brazil, and California. Professor Mearsheimer 
might say this is not the fault of realism, but thanks to the mono-focus on 
projecting coercive power in the world, the U.S. will spend $989 billion dollars 
in one year on its military budget. The U.S. is already in debt to the tune of $23 
trillion dollars, much of this sum being held by China. Yet, while the entire 
budget of the United Nations' environment program is just $222 million, the U.S. 
pays only a small fraction of that. Just think about what could be done about 
climate change if only half of this year's U.S. military budget went to address it. 
And second, when you spend all of that money on weapons, what do you do 
next? You go to war. Realism is behind this country's endless wars. Professor 
Mearsheimer will say that he opposed all foolish wars, but in his book, The 
Grand Delusion, he discusses countering China's growing economic and 
military might and suggests there may be a need to go to war with China. Things 
have gotten so out of hand in America’s lawless campaign to project military 
power that even the U.S. Congress is working to establish legal constraints on 
the executive’s ability to go to war. Two historic war-powers resolutions have 
now been passed, restraining war with Iran and Yemen. This is the right 
approach for the future and the U.S. needs to continue it. These last years of the 
superior U.S. economy should be spent rebuilding the rule of law and restoring 
a sense of prestige in legal compliance over violation. The world should no 
longer give in to the idea that one state can dictate the law, make the rules, and 
break them at will. If the U.S. wants the world legalism can deliver, it needs to 
respect international law and accept it for what it is. The future—your future—
needs to embrace legalism and reject realism. 
 
Desch: Thank you Mary Ellen. The next round is going to be five minutes of 
exchange between John and Mary Ellen. For the folks in the overflow room, if 
you would like to send me a question for either of our speakers during the third 
and final phase of the debate, send them to me at [EMAIL] and I'll try to get it 
in at the Q&A.  
 
Mearsheimer: First of all, I didn't talk about U.S. policy at all, but I just want 
to be clear—as Mary Ellen made clear—that I have opposed U.S. foreign policy 
since 1989, including all of these crazy wars, and almost all of my fellow realists 
have opposed these wars as well. These wars have been promoted by liberal 
institutionalists, liberal interventionists, liberal hegemonists, or 
neoconservatives. As regards her first point, that I've had this profound influence 
on American policy and world politics, I wish it were true. We would have had 
many fewer wars had I been in charge. However, this is not a debate about 
agency versus structure, or how much power individuals have versus the 
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I talk about anarchy. They're synonymous. He talks about individuals in the state 
of nature; I talk about states in anarchy. And my basic argument is that when 
you don't have a higher authority you cannot be certain about the intentions of 
individuals in Hobbes' case and states in my case. When you encounter 
somebody very powerful, you have no choice to privilege survival and the 
balance of power, and that causes you to violate international law. Mary Ellen 
never addressed that point nor did she show any flaw in my logic, and I believe 
that to run me off the table she must show some flaw in my line of thinking. 
Regarding her point that the United States for about 170 years behaved 
according to the rule of law, I respond that this behavior did not occur until after 
realists had started pervading bad ideas in the wake of World War II. Remember 
America’s checkered history. The U.S. started out as thirteen measly colonies 
strung out along the Atlantic seaboard. Colonists marched across the continent 
to the Pacific Ocean, murdered huge numbers of Native Americans and stole 
their land. What is now the southwestern United States was stolen from Mexico. 
America invaded Canada in 1812 for the purpose of making it part of the United 
States. The only reason the Caribbean is not part of the United States today is 
not because the U.S. didn't have a big enough appetite to annex it, but rather 
because the northern states didn't want more slave-holding states in the union. 
When Adolf Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, he often talked 
about the fact that his model was the United States. He referred to the Volga 
River as "mein Mississippi." He described America as a country that really 
knows how to create "lebensraum" (colonization). The United States is one of 
the most ruthless great powers in modern history. The idea that it was promoting 
or adhering to international norms and international law for 170 years doesn't 
bear much resemblance to the story I know. Mary Ellen also pointed out that 
states have other interests besides survival. I think that's absolutely right: states 
have other interests and those interests are important. However, survival has to 
be the primary interest because if you don't survive you can't pursue other 
interests. And this brings back Hobbes who argued for a special priority on 
survival. This priority explains why states will disobey laws in situations where 
such laws are perceived to clash with their vital interests. Mary Ellen says that 
law does not depend on coercion. However, I think that law depends to some 
extent on coercion. It doesn't depend exclusively on coercion. However, 
international law faces significant limits without nation states. People can't just 
depend on the interests or moral virtue of the actors. While I do not disagree that 
these interests and virtues are important, Mary Ellen’s approach still requires the 
presence of a coercive entity called the state or the world state. Finally, I would 
clarify that I was not trying to equate law with liberalism. I think that law is 
terribly important to running the international system and I think it's true in 
domestic politics as well. I've read a number of articles and books over the years 
where people talk about how much emphasis the Third Reich placed on domestic 
law. They really cared about law. Thus, law is very important on its own and I 
wouldn't equate it with liberalism. My simple point is that when you're talking 
about international law, it (1) has great virtues, but (2) there are limits to what it 
can accomplish compared to domestic law because of anarchy and structure—
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Desch: Thank you, John. Mary Ellen, five more minutes. I'll keep track. I'm in 
charge of the rule of law here.  
 
O'Connell: John underplays how much influence he's had and he presents 
himself as humble for playing such a small role. I do not say that the liberal 
hegemonists who have used military force to try to promote their various goals—
such as human rights, arms control, or counterterrorism—are good realists. 
However, I object to the idea that unless you have a military advantage in 
international relations you will not survive in the world. This view presents 
international relations as a competition in which the only moral or correct thing 
for a national leader to do is ascend to the top of a military asset pile. That idea, 
as wrong as it may be, has seeped into America’s foreign policy establishment 
at the expense of a commitment to the rule of law in the world. This has made 
us very vulnerable and put the it in a very dangerous position. Within nine years, 
this country will have the second-largest economy in the world, not the first, and 
then many of Professor Mearsheimer's views look very different. However, I 
suggest to you that by then it may be too late. Originally, I thought China would 
escape the realist notion that it is a good idea to spend significant resources, 
including intellectual capital, on developing new weapons, but China seems to 
be turning toward realism because it sees that the U.S. has been so committed to 
it. Thus, many nations have come to understand that the only way a country gets 
respect from the United States is to have a bigger military. We now find 
ourselves trapped in this realist mentality that the only thing to do is to have 
more weapons, to spend more money on the military, to fight proxy wars, or—
as John suggests in The Grand Delusion—that we may even have to go to war 
with China. This terrifies me most of all because I think invading Iraq was as 
wrong as prolonging the war in Afghanistan. Yet, this is the logic of realism that 
we must escape. Professor Mearsheimer says we cannot escape it because I'm 
not properly describing the true structure of the world, but that “structure” is an 
idea. We cooked this up; this is Thomas Hobbes' view of the world. It wasn't 
Hugo Grotius’ view of the world. Hugo Grotius, Hobbes' contemporary, could 
see that when people come together and cooperate—indeed, even sacrifice—a 
fundamental rule of law system becomes possible. Only then could structures of 
law be formed. And what we've lost through the realist onslaught is a basic belief 
in the human capacity to care about others and care about the law. And while 
Professor Mearsheimer says it works very differently domestically and 
internationally, I'm afraid that it does not. For example, when the United States 
breaches treaties, summarily executes people overseas using drones, ignores the 
most important treaties it has ever drafted and ratified—e.g., the United Nations 
Charter with its core prohibition on the use of force—why does that stop at the 
border? The U.S. often believes that it can break every rule it has ever made. 
Today, in America we have misplaced our priorities. We erroneously believe 
that what matters is having more money or Twitter followers. If that's the kind 
of material power that counts, then why should anyone care what a judge says? 
Why would we care that the congressional designation of spendable monies is 
allocated toward the military and not some other project? We are seeing the law 
degraded at home because we have lost the proper understanding of law in the 
first place. Law is not about being coerced, but instead about commitment to a 
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that don't recognize hegemony or superiority based on money. Law is based on 
humanity and it applies to groups and people. Moreover, you can have law 
without government; this has been the best way to characterize the structural 
world beyond the state and has been the dream of the United States. Has America 
lived up to this dream? Absolutely not. I wish that Professor Mearsheimer had 
mentioned slavery as the original sin of this country, a clear violation of what 
we used to understand as natural law. That understanding has been eroded by 
the onslaught of realism, the new scientism, that is derived from a scientific view 
that material evidence is all that matters. We've lost the great ideas of law. That's 
why I'm so happy we're having this debate at Notre Dame Law School, because 
here we understand natural law and that there never should have been slavery or 
a use of military force to slaughter native peoples in this country. We've lost 
original ideas of natural law in modern science, but we can get them back. We 
are now capable of moving to a deeper and richer understanding of the law at 
home and abroad because we are seeing the cost of not having those old ideas. 
We have become too comfortable stripping them away and entertaining the false 
materialist notion that “if we have more, we can get more” because the U.S. is 
presently ahead in the technological game. Well, it will not be ahead very much 
longer. There is a movement toward generosity and toward understanding these 
more basic natural law ideas. I see this in the vast movement for the environment 
and in the struggle for good governance from Hong Kong to Chile. Many people 
around the word now recognize that this realist, top-down, hegemonic, structural 
view is wrong. The U.S. founding fathers understood that the U.S. may not 
always abide natural law. However, they nonetheless maintained that America 
was established on a natural law basis and that all Americans have an inalienable 
right to live independently. Furthermore, those founding fathers had the genius 
to see that natural law is superior to government and that from it comes a 
commitment to law. This approach should carry greater influence over our 
foreign policy. We would have a much better world today had we not succumbed 
to the competitive, selfish, and self-interested ideas of realism.  
 
Desch: Thank you very much, Professor O'Connell. In my view the institution 
of moderator is misnamed. The moderator should not moderate, the moderator 
should sharpen the debate. Thus, with that presumption in mind, John began by 
observing that from the perspective of realism, international law in terms of even 
great powers abiding by its rules should be evident much of the time. The 
exception is when, in his view, international law contradicts the vital interests of 
the state. What is the poster-child example for you of vital state interests 
trumping international law and how often should we expect to see that in the 
world? Mary Ellen, I want you to answer the opposite side of this coin and 
identify some poster children, or at least a poster child, in which you think 
international law trumps vital state interests. John? 
 
Mearsheimer: When vital interests trumped international law? Well, the Iraq 
war in 2003 offers a classic example for when American policymakers and a 
large chunk of the American public believed that vital interests trumped 
international law. However, the reality in almost all these cases is that laws are 
interpreted in different ways. When the United States violates international law, 
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violating international law is not really violating international law. You folks are 
all trained to make any argument defending any side of a given case. Therefore, 
lawyers provide the U.S. government with an explanation that it is actually 
following international law when it is not.  
 
Desch: How often, in your view Professor Mearsheimer, do you see—or expect 
to see—states directly and overtly violating international law to promote their 
own interests?  
 
Mearsheimer: Not much at all. As I said before, because the great powers write 
the rules and laws they don't have to violate them much at all. Yet we mostly 
hear about the cases in which the law is violated. Leading up to the Iraq War, 
and I think Mary Ellen is correct about the cause of the war in 1999, which was 
itself a violation of international law. There are a number of similar cases, but 
they are high profile matters that involve military conflict of some variety. 
However, the vast majority of the time the United States is obeying the rules 
because it wrote them. And furthermore, in this highly interdependent world that 
we live in, there is no way you can run it without rules. I think President Donald 
Trump, with his profound hostility towards international institutions and belief 
that you can essentially do away with them and the United States can run the 
world out of its back pocket, is delusional. And again, when we waged the Cold 
War, we built institutions. I know Mary Ellen doesn't want to hear this, but we're 
loading up the shotgun to deal with China; that's what the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) was. It was foolish of President Trump to withdraw from the 
TPP. The TPP was an institution that was created by the Obama Administration 
for the purpose of putting the crosshairs on China. 
 
Desch: Thanks. Mary Ellen, an example of a poster child of international law 
trumping vital national interests? 
 
O'Connell: I just don't see the duality in your question. It is in the U.S.' national 
interests to comply with international law, so I don't make the separation that 
you do. Everything that Professor Mearsheimer said is enhanced if you believe 
that the U.S. has an honest—as opposed to a cynical—view of the law. The TPP 
is a desirable treaty. But who's going to make a treaty with the United States 
today, when the U.S. walks away from treaties and says it can just tear them up. 
If we decide treaties are not in our vital interests, we'll just walk away. We'll 
quote Mearsheimer. You can't have your cake and eat it. If treaties of any kind—
trade treaties or arms control treaties—are going to work, they must be shown a 
level of acceptance and respect by leading countries like the United States. 
Treaties that are not respected will not produce benefits. True, we skated through 
the post-Cold-War period for a while saying "well we can have this law but we 
don't need to bother about that law." That's the story of the Iraq Invasion of 2003. 
The U.S. simply claimed "we still deserve the prestige of law, because we have 
a legal argument in the form of a letter to the Security Council." No international 
professional lawyer who understands the law on the use of force, unless working 
for the U.S. government or British government, or recently employed by them, 
believes the Iraq Invasion was lawful. And now, where are we? Do you know 
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made for his unlawful uses of force? One. He sent a letter after the killing of 
Qasem Soleimani. That's it. He ignored the uses of military force against Syria, 
the hundreds of drone strikes carried out by the U.S. around the world, and his 
planned attack against Iran last summer. Why should President Trump bother? 
He's read Professor Mearsheimer’s work. He knows the lawyers will just tell 
him he can do what he wants and that he doesn't have to obey the law. Thus, the 
impact of realism is that we no longer understand what the law is. Law properly 
understood binds people and nations on a comprehensive basis, first and 
foremost as natural law. That's not law we make up. That's law that we discern 
through our ethical and moral understanding to be required for how to behave 
with each other in ways of respect and dignity. That's what law is. It has plenty 
of positive law layered on top of it, but if you ignore that structural aspect of 
law, you're never going to get the benefits of law that Professor Mearsheimer 
correctly wants.  
 
Desch: Okay, we have a question from an undergraduate who is in the overflow 
room. For you, Mary Ellen, that will maybe prompt you to elaborate your last 
point. Nick writes: what exactly does Professor O'Connell mean by the notion 
that law precedes states. It seems like a very counterintuitive idea. Is she 
speaking of a divine law or a natural law? If she is speaking of civil law, how 
could it exist before the state does? 
 
O'Connell: We don't talk about civil law as distinct in the field of international 
law. International law has three components: positive law made through treaties, 
the development of custom among nations, and certain general principles that 
are found through comparing national law. This framework accounts for the fact 
that law is binding; the principles that we make through positive law should be 
respected and should change and be developed only through authoritative 
processes: treaty-making and customary law-making. Natural law sets the outer 
limits of the positive law we can make. It tells us we can never have a treaty that 
would allow the use of military force because the use of military force is 
fundamentally prohibited as a feature of natural law. Genocide is also prohibited 
by natural law. Consequently, you could never have a treaty that permits one 
state to wipe out a group of people in another state. That is natural law and you 
have to have both natural and positive law to have a truly effective legal system. 
Where does the institution of the state come from? Take the U.S. for example. 
It was not a sovereign state in 1776. The U.S. wanted to be accepted into the 
community of states and it had to make the legal argument that it deserved 
recognition as a state in accordance with certain factors. These factors include 
having a population, a sense of boundaries, a government in effective control, 
and that the young nation would honor its international commitments. That's 
how any entity becomes a state. It is what the Palestinians are searching for now: 
a sense of acceptance into a system of states. For international law to exist at all, 
and to offer that status to any entity like Palestinians or like early Americans, 
there must be an international system grounded in natural law. However, as our 
founding fathers understood, the governments of the many states they wanted 
America to join already accepted international law as their common bond; 
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admission into that club of states. Therefore, without law, you don't get states, 
let alone governance.  
 
Desch: Okay, I'm going to throw it open to the audience. The jeopardy rule is in 
force, meaning whatever you say has to be brief and end with a question mark. 
One question per person. Andrew, we'll start out with you, and then Roger. 
 
Andrew: Thank you to you both. You both alluded to the rise of China, 
especially on the world stage. And I know China has increasingly exerted more 
influence in the United Nations. I'm wondering how both of you see the next 
decade. How do you see American involvement with international rules of law, 
particularly as they change in response to China's growing influence? Especially 
for you, Professor Mearsheimer, do you think there will arise situation in which 
the U.S. will have to disobey, like you said in your theory?  
 
Mearsheimer: On the subject of China, as Mary Ellen said, the Chinese are 
realists to the core. She thinks it is a recent development. I don't think it's a recent 
development. When I go to China and I open my talks, I say "it's good to be back 
among my people," because China is a thoroughly realist country. Mary Ellen 
thinks that it's because they read my book or are imitating the United States. No, 
it's because China was weak from roughly 1850 to 1950. They refer to that 
period as “the century of national humiliation”. The Chinese fully understand 
that weakness in international politics precedes falling prey to the other great 
powers. Accordingly, many nations really want to be powerful. This has been 
very difficult for Americans to understand because we were born into this very 
powerful country and we take it for granted. However, were we a small country 
surrounded by gorillas we would think about international politics in 
fundamentally different ways—and I can guarantee you the Chinese are nervous 
at the thought of being weak. They want to really be powerful and they'll do 
everything they can to push the United States out of Asia—first beyond the first 
island chain and then beyond the second island chain. As I tell them when I go 
to China, if I were sitting in Beijing and I were the national security advisor to 
the Chinese government, I'd want the Americans out too. However, I'm an 
American and I have no intention of letting China push the U.S. beyond the first 
island chain, much less the second island chain. And that's what's going to lead 
to the clash. Regarding international institutions, this is a fascinating question. 
The U.N. is basically useless for modulating or dealing with the U.S.-China 
competition because of the veto. If the U.S. pushes something the Chinese do 
not like, they will veto it, and vice versa. Like in the Cold War, the U.N. will not 
be very useful. What's actually going to happen here is that the Chinese and the 
Americans will create their own institutions. During the Cold War, the West had 
several institutions that included NATO, the European Union, International 
Monetary Fund, and World Bank. On the eastern side, you had Comecon and 
the Warsaw Pact. Those were the Soviet-dominated institutions and those 
institutions were designed to wage the Cold War. This is the road that we are 
headed down today with the Asian Investment International Bank (AIIB) and 
the Belt and Road. This was what the TPP was all about and why the Trump 
Administration was foolish to walk away from it. I'll be long dead by the time 







103 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:1 
 
creation of the set of Chinese-dominated institutions and American-dominated 
institutions for purposes of waging the competition that I think is almost sure to 
occur between those two countries. I do think it is a tragedy, but my view of 
international politics is a tragic one.  
 
Desch: Mary Ellen, to throw a related question on the table, Nick Carter, another 
undergraduate, asks how a return to legalism by the United States—were it to 
happen—would help to better manage the rise of China than John's realpolitik 
redux approach? 
 
O'Connell: Great question. I'm a student of Chinese history and I could debate 
with Professor Mearsheimer how to best characterize China as a country. I will 
concede that China under communism is fundamentally oriented toward 
materialism, and this has left it vulnerable to adopting the realist approach that 
we see in U.S. foreign policy. There they are beginning to believe they also have 
to compete by piling up lots of weapons and projecting aggression around the 
world in an attempt to dominate their sphere of influences. Dealing with that 
presents a losing prospect for the U.S. I do think that a return to legalism is really 
the only way forward for the U.S. and I don't think we got anywhere by being 
realists. However, China effectively owns the U.S. already. As economists are 
telling us, we are not going to have more money than China in a few years. What 
I would suggest, and what I have written in my new book, The Art of Law in the 
International Community, is that we can invite cooperation for the good of the 
planet as a whole; we can work with the Chinese to help them solve some of 
their problems with corruption and over-emphasis on materialism in their own 
system. This approach has left them unable to deal, for example, with the 
coronavirus pandemic. The U.S., as a country founded upon the rule of law, can 
begin to teach this. Sadly, it can't happen all at once—well, it might happen 
quickly if we have another catastrophic disaster—and I'd rather see U.S. do this 
incrementally because the realist ideas we heard from Professor Mearsheimer 
run deep in China. We have to begin somewhere to show the benefit of moving 
forward. I also agree that we have to try to revive the U.N. The realists have 
really undermined the U.N; I've never seen it so weak. If President Trump is re-
elected, I can fully imagine the U.S. will leave the U.N. 
 
Desch: Okay, Roger Alford is next on the list.  
 
Alford: I think the entire debate is based on a faulty premise that international 
law routinely rests on the question of the law of conflict. I think that the vast 
majority of international law has nothing to do with this. It would be a bit like 
saying when you go to law school all you talk about is criminal law and the 
protection against violent crime. But international law is focused on dual 
taxation treaties, contracts, aviation and open skies, telecommunications, 
energy, environmental law, trade, monetary policy, extradition, intellectual 
property, competition law, freedom of speech, among others. The vast majority 
of international law has nothing to do with conflict.  
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Mearsheimer: I believe I said that. In response to Michael, I don't disagree. But 
we do have these things called the laws of war and we do have wars, and wars 
matter enormously. It matters more than all those other things you were talking 
about.  
 
Desch: Okay, we have a lot of questions piling up, and the carriage turns into a 
pumpkin at 1:45, so I want to keep things moving along. The gentleman in the 
blue suit in the front row. 
 
Audience member 1: Professor O’Connell, you discussed the concept of natural 
law. How do we defend international law if we equalize natural law to 
international law or put it in the same bucket? 
 
O'Connell: Oh yes. I didn't say this would be easy. We, and by “we” I mean the 
U.S., have lost a lot of ground after the 60's, when we started to define success 
in terms of keeping a technological and material advantage over others. And it 
was at the same time that we lost a more comprehensive understanding of what 
law even is and focused narrowly on the law we could make ourselves. Then we 
thought that we could break the law because we are so powerful with all our 
weapons. No one was going to force our compliance. America lost the idea that 
it is the sanctity of treaties and the jus cogens peremptory norms that really 
matters and we just don't know how to talk about them anymore. One of the big 
commitments made by Notre Dame Law School is to resurrect this language 
understanding. It will be up to people like you studying here at this law school 
to help get that very difficult and challenging message out. I think you are up to 
the task, because you have the ideas and see all the practical things that 
international law does, including those that Professor Alford mentioned. You 
understand fundamentally that you don't get those practical benefits unless 
you're willing to accept—at some basic level—that it all applies, and that even 
countries with lots of weapons don't get to pick and choose which laws they will 
follow at will. Thus, the good parts of international law inevitably require some 
self-sacrifice. I think it's in the spirit of generosity and other-orientedness. I don't 
have a tragic view of life. I think we're capable of so much, and it's a matter of 
unleashing it and getting ourselves out of this cul-de-sac that we've painted 
ourselves into, especially in this very privileged country. So, thank you for being 
here; help spread this word when you go back to Chile to teach.  
 
Desch: Okay, I don't have a tragic view of life either, but I do have a tragic view 
of the clock. So, we've got time for a very brief question from the gentleman in 
the back.  
 
Audience member 2: Professor O'Connell, you discussed militarism as in direct 
opposition to legalism, but what happens when you have people who just won’t 
obey the laws? For example, consider a situation where the military is broken 
down or at least where military spending is cut. What stops the lawbreakers?  
 
O'Connell: Law functions fundamentally first and foremost without coercion. 
You need voluntary compliance with only a minimal threat of coercion. There's 
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threatening penalties. That said, we have long accepted that some coercion is 
certainly appropriate to signal the importance of a rule. Indeed, part of the reason 
why we set up the United Nations—the reason envisioned by President Franklin 
Roosevelt—was to have an effective response to the core rule behind the United 
Nations Charter—the Article 2 prohibition against the use of force. Roosevelt 
wanted a collective means to respond when core rules were violated. However, 
what happened was the U.S. took advantage of its technological and military 
superiority; instead of saying the U.S. would comply and respect the rules, it 
tried to have its cake and eat it too. As a result, the U.N. is now dysfunctional as 
a neutral enforcer of the law. It still has some coercive means left for responding 
to crises, but even those have been badly abused by the United States. Economic 
countermeasures could be a very effective means for enforcing the law short of 
going to war. However, the United States is imposing countermeasures in 
violation of the law such as right now in Iran. We have a lot of work to do before 
these mechanisms function well. Thank you very much for your question. 
 
Desch: Okay I'm going to read one more question and this could be a set up to 
final remarks from our speakers, because I think it's addressed to both of you. 
"Forgive me if I'm missing something basic, but I'm wondering what exactly is 
at stake here? Is the debate descriptive in the sense that you are comparing 
analytical frameworks for understanding states' actions or is it proscriptive in the 
sense of advocating that states should act in a legalistic way?" What is at stake 
here and if you want to fold in any last thoughts on anything else as well. John, 
why don't you start out. 
 
Mearsheimer: What is at stake is an important intellectual discussion about one 
of the central issues of international politics and not much more needs to be said 
about that. I'd make two additional points in the minutes allotted. I hope that 
people don't believe I think that international law is irrelevant or bad and I went 
to great lengths to make the case that I thought international law serves a very 
important purpose. And Mary Ellen's comments cut in the other direction and 
portray me as someone who is hostile to international law. I'm not. My main 
point here is to emphasize the limits of international law when it comes to the 
security realm. I think it is very important to understand that fact. You want to 
know the strengths of international law and we've emphasized them here, me 
included, as well as the limits, because it sharpens your mind. I think the key 
limit boils down to the question asked earlier: what does legalism do when 
confronted with Adolf Hitler? I don't believe Mary Ellen answered that question, 
just like I don't believe she answered my question of how we should deal with 
the Hobbesian dilemma. 
 
O'Connell: Thank you. I think Professor Mearsheimer and I were both being 
descriptive and proscriptive. We actually agreed quite a bit on what we're both 
seeing in the world. He believes the way forward is with a good deal 
of international law but not in the realm of military force, where it really counts. 
I'm saying you can't enjoy the benefits of international law unless you're willing 
to apply it to the military realm. International law is clear. There are times when 
military force is lawful. The United States used military force lawfully one time 
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it has proven a general success: when we helped Kuwait become liberated from 
Iraq after Iraq invaded in violation of the U.N. Charter in 1990. The world came 
together at the U.N. and worked together to liberate Kuwait, and Kuwait has 
been liberated for almost 30 years. Kuwait has maintained its independence 
thanks to the U.N. Charter and not the kinds of regime change that Vice 
President Cheney wanted, many of which would have gone beyond what 
international law required. If that's my last word, even in the military realm, 
obeying the law has extraordinary benefits, and can help us free up resources for 
the challenges human beings really need to tackle.  
 
Desch: I have one more task, and I ask John and Mary Ellen to come up right 
next to me here. It's the end of the fifteenth round. I want you to join me in 
thanking both the speakers for a terrific back-and-forth.  
 
 
 
 
